


**00196**

**1970/11/24**



November 24, 1970

**SECRET**

Memorandum for Henry A. Kissinger

From: Wihston Lord

Subject: Dick Moorsteen on China Policy


Attached is another letter to you from Dick Moorsteen concerning the review of our China policy. He suggests that in one of your next backgrounders you should refer to our orderly review of China policy to show that we are serious and not stampeded by tactical events and to warn other governments to wait and see how our policy evolves before committing themselves.

I agree with Dick that it would be useful for you to include references to our China policy review in the next backgrounders. He is also correct in pointing out that we must consider the UN ChiRep question in the broader context of our long term China policy and not let the former tactical issue lock us in on a strategic course without being aware of the consequences.

Moorsteen wrote his letter on the assumption that we might be establishing a China policy group. This of course is not the case for now, as we have merely called for a study of China policy.

WL:ms:11/24/70

*cc: Gen. Hsieh*



97 Malibu Colony  
Malibu, California

Dear Henry,

Below are some further thoughts about the China Policy Group (my letter of October 8), should you be inclined to try it. They are stimulated by what looks to me, as a newspaper reader, like a dicey go-around over CHIREP this year.

In addition to the near-term aspects I listed last time (signaling the seriousness of our interest to Russia, China and the public), CHIREP poses some new ones:


- Should there be any danger of a band wagon toward Peking's view of CHIREP, we want to stop it. We certainly don't want to start one — or even appear to have done so. .
- We don't want current urgency about CHIREP to lock us or other governments into long-term policies toward Peking that may grow hard to live with later.

Our message to all concerned, therefore, should be "You'd better find out more about where the Americans are going, before you...." It has to sound serious, but it should not suggest we are moving in any particular direction. And it should not sound as though we were triggered into action because of CHIREP.

To me, this suggests holding down on drama, but going into the necessary amount of detail. The regional backgrounders you give are good for the purpose, because they are established as normal and have a written transcript. The latter, incidentally, gets around. Someone I know was shown one by Japanese friends in Tokyo. The China Policy Group could fit in as an illustration of the orderliness, breadth and long-term perspective with which we make policy -- perhaps after listing some other areas in which this is also true. Whatever you say will be carefully studied.

I'm attaching a few points that might be worth including. Mort Abramowitz and I have a draft paper on long-term development of China policy. We'll have it in final shape by Thanksgiving. If you organize the Group, it might provide some fodder.

Sincerely yours,



1. Not triggered by CHIREP. This Administration did a thorough review of China policy among its first acts in office. As needed, it did additional government-wide studies. Then some time ago we decided to put things on a continuing basis, with high-level guidance -- which led us to set up the China Policy Group.

2. No future U.S. direction exposed. The Group is in the course of reviewing our China policy from A to Z -- No change at all; Two China's; One China; One China, One Taiwan; beefing up our Asian deterrent; seeking mutual accommodation with Peking. For tough talk, the potential benefits (and drawbacks too) of our having Taiwan as a military base could even be used to illustrate why such thorough study is necessary.

3. U.S. flexibility. We prefer directions that ease our relations with Peking, but that depends on Peking too. We haven't heard from them lately. We are willing to talk with them about any important subject, at any level.

4. Other governments should wait. We have always exchanged views on China policy with our friends. We will now have a better basis for doing so. As our studies progress, but before they crystallize, we will be exchanging views and ideas in a much more systematic fashion.